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I.

BACKGROUND................................................................

INTRODUCTION

In the American scheme of federalism, the policies and procedures for

adoption, like family law generally, have traditionally been the province of
state law. 1 By contrast, Congress has plenary power over Indian tribes and
government Indian policy. 2 These two legal regimes converge in the federal

* Lecturer, University of Michigan Law School and University of Chicago Law
School. J.D., University of Michigan; A.B., Indiana University. I warmly acknowledge my
friend and Pi Kappa Phi brother T.J. Sullivan and his partner Scott Strong, whose successful
struggle to adopt their son Tim inspired my interest in this fascinating subject.

1. A growing body of commentary, however, notes that this understanding has
changed as scholars explore how the federal governmnent has long been involved in
regulating the family and how that involvement has increased. See generally, e.g., Ann
Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267 (2009); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalismand the Family Reconstructed.

45 UCLA L. Rev. 1297 (1998).
2. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553, 564-65 (1903).
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Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA").' ICWA partially preempts state law in
certain proceedings involving Indian children, pursuant to a Congressional
policy of preventing the improper removal of these children from Indian
homes.4 Among other provisions, ICWA specifies that when an Indian child is
adopted, preference must be given to a member of the child's extended family,
a member of the child's tribe, or a member of another Indian tribe. 5
Hold that thought and consider that adoption by gay men, lesbians, and
same-sex couples has become an increasingly mainstream phenomenon.
Reliable estimates show that more than 65,000 adopted children are living with
a gay or lesbian parent, and some two million gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
have considered adopting or would like to do so. 6 But state adoption policies
vary, and so gays and lesbians, or same-sex couples seeking to adopt jointly,
face a patchwork of adoption laws ranging from inclusive to hostile to simply
unclear.'
I could find no reported adoption cases under ICWA where the sexual
orientation of the would-be parent(s) was an issue. Yet it seems inevitable such
cases will arise.' The phenomenon of sexual and gender diversity has deep
roots in Native American history and culture, and contemporary Indian tribes
are affected by the same political and legal controversies over same-sex
relationships that have occupied American legislators and jurists in recent
years. 9 While there is much evidence that Western culture and religion have
eroded tribal traditions once honoring "two-spirit" individuals,1 0 one
commentator has speculated that "[iln contrast to the approach of many state
courts and legislatures, some tribal communities may be more receptive to
adoption by gays and lesbians" because "there is evidence of a greater tolerance
in many tribal societies for ambiguity in gender-identification."" And although
there is apparently no codified tribal law on the question of adoption by
homosexuals,'" at least one tribal court has found a lesbian couple was

3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2006).

IN

4. See infra Part I.A.
5. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2006).
6. GARY J. GATES ET AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE By GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS
THE UNITED STATES 6-7 (The Williams Institute and Urban Institute 2007),

http://www.law.ucia.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/FinalAdoptionReport.pdf
Williams/Urban Institute Report].

[hereinafter

7. See infra Part I.B.
8. Indeed, they almost certainly have already, but it is hard to know because most
adoption proceedings are confidential and the details are not reported unless they go up on
appeal.
9. See infra Part 1.C.
10. See infra notes 54-5 7 and accompanying text.

11. Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the Family,
79

L. Rnv. 577, 619 (2000).
12. Id. at 620.

NEB.
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''competent and qualified'' to adopt and "fit to provide a home environment for
the healthy development of the children."" 3
Quirks of geography might also bring the issue to the fore. For example,
California, which has one of the nation's largest Indian populations,"4 also has
the largest number of adopted children living with gay or lesbian parents.'"
Other states with some of the largest Indian populations-North Carolina,
Arizona, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Texas, the Dakotas, Alaska, Montana, and
Washington' 6 -are politically diverse on gay/lesbian issues, some conservative
and some liberal. 7 Furthermore, a state's political climate may affect the
decision of a family court judge exercising discretion in absence of clear state
law.
When a petitioner's sexual orientation becomes an issue in an adoption
proceeding under ICWA, the question will arise: do the federal policies
embedded in ICWA ever determine, or at least influence, whether or not such
an adoption must be granted or subsequently recognized as valid, taking into
account the petitioner's sexual orientation? Even though ICWA makes no
mention of sexual orientation and, ostensibly, has nothing to do with
gay/lesbian adoption, I will explain the answer is yes: where a prospective
parent's sexual orientation is an issue in the adoption of an Indian child,
sometimes ICWA will make a difference in whether the adoption is granted or
recognized.
In Part 1, 1 provide some brief background on IC WA's legislative history,
the current status of gay/lesbian adoption in the United States, and Indian
attitudes toward homosexuality and same-sex relationships. In Part 11, 1 explore
the impact of ICWA on adoption proceedings in tribal court. I explain that,
under certain circumstances, ICWA's requirements might lead to a gay or
lesbian individual or couple being denied an adoption in tribal court that they
could have obtained in state court.'18 In other circumstances, ICWA will require
13. In re Adoption of Ashley Feisman, 23

INDIAN L. RPTR.

6086, 6087 (C.S.&K.T Ct.

App. 1996); see also Atwood, supra note 11, at 620-21 (discussing this case in more detail).
14. See Total Natice Americans - Kaiser State Health Facts, THE HENRY J. KAISER
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=45 1&cat-9
FOUNDATION,
FAMILY
&sub=1I06&yr1-I99&typ=l &sort--a&o=a&sortc= 1 (last visited Nov 4, 2010) [hereinafter
"Native Population Ranking"].
15. Williamns/Urban Institute Report, supra note 6, at 7.
16. See Native Population Ranking, supra note 14.
17. For example, New Mexico, Washington, Wisconsin, and New York prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while the other listed states do
not. See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Employment Laws & Policies (2010),
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Employment -Laws-andPolicies.pdf. New York also will
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions (though it will not grant such
marriages), while the other listed states, except for New Mexico, maintain statutes or state
constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriages. See Human Rights Campaign,
Statewide Marriage Prohibition (2010), http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_.
http://www.hrc.org/documents/marriage_
and
RecognitionLaws Map.pdf
prohibitions_-2009.pdf.
18. See infra Part ll.A.
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a state to recognize a gay/lesbian adoption finalized in tribal court even though
that state would not have granted the placement itself."9 In Part 1I1, I discuss
ICWA's application to adoption proceedings in state court. Specifically, I
discuss whether ICWA gives decisive leverage in a state-court adoption
proceeding to a tribe's views on homosexuality; I conclude it does not.2
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, I argue that ICWA should override a
state's anti-gay adoption policy if such a law would present a roadblock to the
placement of an Indian child in an Indian home.'
As a federal statute that partially preempts state law for the benefit of
Native Americans, ICWA implicates three sovereigns: the United States, the
state where the adoption petition is brought, and the tribe whose child is the
focus of the proceeding. This interplay of sovereigns in itself makes Indian
child welfare law complicated and interesting. Beyond these sovereign
interests, also to be considered are the interests and rights of individuals: the
child, the birth parents, and the prospective adoptive parent(s).
In cases where the petitioner's sexual orientation is an issue, an Indian
child adoption proceeding also holds the potential to become a clash of
cultures. A tribe with a tradition of tolerance toward sexual or gender diversity
might find its members in the courts of a state with a public policy that
disapproves of gays and lesbians as adoptive parents. Or the opposite may
occur: a tribe might object based on its cultural beliefs to a child's placement in
a gay or lesbian household, even though the state supports adoption equality.
Prospective parents who are required to bring a petition in tribal court may find
themselves in a legal world that subordinates their interests to those of the child
or the tribe, operates by informal rules, and looks to cultural traditions in
rendering legal judgments.2
These scenarios all arise at the tangled intersection of traditional state
family law, Indian culture, federal Indian policy, and evolving principles of
gay/lesbian equality. They implicate both practical and doctrinal puzzles, but so
far scholars have had little or nothing to say about them.
Every adoption case is unique, and so I do not purport to anticipate every
possible scenario involving Indian children and prospective gay/lesbian
parents. My goal is to highlight a few important principles and sketch several
arguments that may be helpful to courts, scholars, tribes, and adoptive families,
and to leave the reader with a greater appreciation of the tensions among
federalism, tribal self-determination, and individual liberties.

19.
20.
2 1.
22.

See
See
See
See

infra Part HIB.
infra Part 1IIB.
infra Part III.C.
infra note 126 and accompanying text.
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1. BACKGROUND
A.

ICWA andAdoption

Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 after extensive hearings revealed a
widespread problem of Indian children being inappropriately removed from
their homes and reservations by state child welfare authorities. Specifically,
Congress found "that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are
broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by
nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of
such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and
institutions , 2 ' and "that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over
Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies,
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and
the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and
families.",24 In ICWA, Congress declared
it is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the
removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of
such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the
unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to
Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service programs.2
Similarly, in its only decision interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court has
described ICWA as "the product of rising concern in the mid- 1970's over the
consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive
child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian
children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care
placement, usually in non-Indian homes."2 ICWA, the Court said, establishes
"'a Federal policy that, where possible, an Indian child should remain in the

Indian community.,,

27

To address the problems Congress found, ICWA "constructs a statutory
scheme to prevent states from improperly removing Indian children from their
parents, extended families, and tribes.",2 1 ICWA partially preempts state law by
23. 25 U.S.C. § 190 1(4) (2006).
24. Id. § 1901(5).
25. Id. § 1902.

26. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989).
27. Id. at 37 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 23 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546.)). For more on ICWA's legislative history, see, e.g., CoHWN's
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 11.01 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis,
2005 Edition) [hereinafter COHEN's]; 3 ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE (Joan H. Hollinger ed.,
Matthew Bender, 2008 Edition) § 15.01 [2] [hereinafter Hollinger].
28. CoHEN's, supra note 27, at 820.
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providing jurisdictional allocations, substantive requirements, and procedural
rules for proceedings involving an Indian child 29 for foster care placement,
termination of parental rights, pre-adoptive placement, and adoption. 30 (It does
not apply to custody disputes arising from divorce.)
Regarding adoption, ICWA does several things. First, it allocates
jurisdiction. If the Indian child is domiciled on an Indian reservation or has
been made a ward of a tribal court, ICWA gives the tribal court exclusive
jurisdiction over all proceedings.' If the child resides off the reservation, a state
court may exercise its normal jurisdiction.3 However, if the proceeding
involves foster care placement or termination of parental rights, ICWA
provides that a state court "shall" transfer the matter to tribal court upon
petition of either parent, the child's Indian custodian, or the tribe; the request
for transfer may be denied if either parent objects or for "good cause." 33 Where
the adoption is voluntary (i.e., the birth parents freely relinquish their rights
over the child), ICWA does not provide for transfer to tribal court.3
Second, ICWA specifies an order of preference for placement of an Indian
child. "Before a state court may place an Indian child in a non-Indian adoptive
home, the court must give sequential placement preference to, first, the child's
extended family,["5 ] second, to other members of the child's tribe, and third, to
other Indian families . ,.36 The Supreme Court has characterized ICWA's
adoption placement preferences as "[t]he most important substantive
requirement imposed on the state.",37 "More than any other substantive
requirement," the placement provision "reflects the underlying assumption of

29. ICWA defines an Indian child as "any unmarried person who is under age eighteen
and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2006).
30. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(l) (2006) (defining a "child custody proceeding" under

ICWA).
3 1. Id. § 1911 (a).
32. See id. § 1911 (b).
33. Id. For discussion of how courts have used and abused the "good cause" exception,
see Hollinger, supra note 27, § 15,02[3][b].
34. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (b) (2006) (providing for transfer "[iun any State court proceeding
for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child"); see
also STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 337 (3d ed. 2002) ("When
removal from the home is voluntary (and the child resides off the resevation) ... the tribe
cannot insist on having the case transferred to tribal court."); but see Hollinger, supra note
27, § 15.02[2] (stating that the transfer provisions apply to any "child custody proceedings
involving ... non-reservation children").
35. ICWA states that an extended family member "shall be as defined by the law or
custom of the Indian child's tribe or, in the absence of such law or customn, shall be a person
who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child's grandparent, aunt or uncle,
brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) ( 2006).
36. PEVAR, supra note 34, at 335; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
37. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989).
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ICWA that Indian children have a strong interest in preserving their tribal ties,
38
and their best interests coincide with their tribe'S."
Third, where a proceeding is in state court, ICWA gives the child's tribe
rights to notice and intervention, but only where the court is adjudicating foster
care placement or terminating parental rights.3 Most authorities agree that
ICWA does not require notice or provide for tribal intervention as a matter of
right in voluntary adoption proceedings.4
B.

Gay and Lesbian Adoption in the United States

As political and legal issues involving sexual orientation have become
more mainstream, better data have become available about parenting by gay
men, lesbians, and same-sex couples. A 2007 report by researchers at the
Williams Institute of UCLA Law School and the Urban Institute, drawing on
data from the 2000 Census and other sources, found among other things:
and 14,100 foster children
* an estimated 65,500 adopted children
41
were living with gay or lesbian parents;
* gay and lesbian parents were raising four percent of all adopted
42
children and three percent of foster children in the United States;
and
* an estimated two million gays, lesbians, and bisexuals were
interested in adopting. 3
Despite their progress in gaining acceptance for their right to form legal
family relationships, gays, lesbians, and same-sex couples face "a patchwork
quilt of state adoption laws.""4 At present, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Utah restrict adoptions by same-sex couples or individuals in same-sex
relationships. In light of the resurgence of social conservatives and the capture
of more state legislatures by Republicans in the 2010 elections, it is possible
there will be new efforts to restrict adoptions by gay or lesbian individuals or
couples. While no state currently bans adoptions by single gay or lesbians
outright' 46 someone in a same-sex marriage or other partnered relationship may

38.

COHEN'S, supra note 27, at 842-43.
39. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2006).
40. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
41. Williams/Urban Institute Report, supra note 6, at 7, 15.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My Mother?: Interstate Recognition Of
Adoptions by Gays and Lesbians, 58 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2008).
45. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-204 (2009); See LA. CILD. CODE MfN. art. 1221
(2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-30-1(3) (2008).
46. Florida did so for more than 30 years until its ban was struck down in 2010 by a
state appellate court. See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.XG. &
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face obstacles whether they seek to adopt singly or

jointly. 47
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Moreover, in

many states the legal status of joint or second-parent adoptions involving samesex couples is unclear, with individual judges left to consider such petitions on
a case-by-case basis.4
C. Indian Attitudes Toward Homosexuality and Same-sex Relationships
Contemporary Native American attitudes toward homosexuality and
same-sex relationships appear to range widely from honor to condemnation, as
scholars, tribal leaders, and activists attempt to understand how ancient
traditions have been transmitted, reinterpreted, or lost in contemporary Indian
societies.
It is well documented that "[b]efore the massive impact of Western culture
and its belief systems on North American Indian cultures, gender variance
existed in most tribes from Alaska to what is now the border between the
United States and Mexico." 9 Much anthropological research on sexuality and
gender diversity among Indians once focused on the "berdache," which one
scholar has defined as an androgynous, "morphological male who does not fill
50
a society's standard man's role, who has a nonmasculine character. "
Such a person has a clearly recognized and accepted social status,
often based on a secure place in the tribal mythology. Berdaches
have special ceremonial roles in many Native American religions,
and important economic roles in their families . .. They are not seen
as men, yet they are not seen as women either. They occupy an
alternative gender role that is a mixture of diverse elements.'
And although "[n]early all academic publications investigating Native
American sexuality or gender diversity have tended to emphasize male
homosexualities or male gender blending," the existence of "manly women,
female homosexualities, or female-bodied third or fourth genders" also "ha[s]
been documented in tribes that range from the Southwest through the Plains
N.R.G., No. 31308-3044, 2010 XVL 3655782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2010). The state
did not appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.
47. See supra note 45 and statutes cited therein.
48. For databases of adoption laws by state, see Thomson Reuters, STATE ADOPTION
LAWS

-

STATE LAWS, CODES,

http://law.findlaw.com/

state-laws/adoption! (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) and The Human Rights Campaign, HRC I
ADOPTION, http://www.hrc.org/issuesl
parenting/adoptions/adoption Iaws.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
49. Sabine Lang, Various Kinds of Two-Spirit People: Gender Variance and
Homosexuality in Native American Communities, in Two-SPIRIT PEOPLE: NATIVE AMERICAN
GENDER IDENTITY, SEXUALITY, AND SPIRITUALITY

100, 107 (Sue-Ellen Jacobs et al. eds.,

1997) (citing various studies by anthropologists and sexuality researchers).
50. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, THE SPIRIT AND THE FLESH: SEXUAL DIVERSITY IN
AMERICAN INDIAN CULTURE

2 (1986).

5 1. Id.
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and the Great Lakes to the Subarctic."5 In recent years the label "berdache" has
been replaced by the term "two-spirit," which has come to encompass gays,
lesbians, transgender persons, and "traditions wherein multiple gender
categories and sexualities are institutionalized in Native American/First Nations
53
tribal cultures."

"Although two-spirit individuals and their same-sex relationships seem to
have been freely accepted in those Native American cultures that provided
multiple genders," one scholar writes, "the attitude toward sexuality in general
and same-sex relationships in particular has changed dramatically on many
reservations due to long-term exposure to Western religion, boarding schools,
and, more recently, the media."514 Thus, another commentator observes, sexual
and gender difference present a "conundrum" for contemporary Indian tribes:55
Traditionally, many tribes allowed two-spirit individuals to have
relationships with members of the same biological sex, although
most tribes still valued heterosexual relationships more than
homosexual relationships. Today, however, like other Americans, a
large faction of Native Americans condemn homosexuality and
completely reject same-sex unions largely because of the influence of
European and American religion and culture.5
Another scholar asks,
What do the stories of today tell us about tolerance (or intolerance)
for gender and sexuality diversity in Native North American
communities, as well as communities throughout the world? Ask the
people who are openly living their homosexual, gay, lesbian, queer,
bisexual, or transgendered lives in their own or other communities.
Many will agree with [sexuality researcher Robert] Stoller about
"observations long since noted on the deterioration in American
Indians of techniques for ritualizing cross-gender behavior. No
longer is a place provided for the role-more, the identity--of a
male-woman, the dimensions of which are fixed by custom, rules,
The tribes have forgotten. Instead, the
tradeoffs, or responsibilities.
57
role appears as a ghost.",

52. Sue-Ellen Jacobs et al., Introduction, in

Two-SPIRIT PEOPLE, supra note 49, at 5

(footnotes omitted).
53. Id. at 2.
54. Lang, Various Kinds of Two-Spirit People, supra note 49, at 107-08.
55. Jeffr~ey S. Jacobi, Two Spirits, Two Eras, Same Sex: For a Traditionalist
Perspective on Native American Tribal Same-Sex MarriagePolicy, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
823, 825 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. (footnotes omitted)
57. Sue-Ellen Jacobs, Is the 'Berdache' a Phantom in Western Imagination?, in TwoSPIRIT PEOPLE, supra note 49, at 35.
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In contemporary Indian legal regimes, there appears to be no consensus
about same-sex relationships, to the extent the topic is addressed at all. In 2008,
the Coquille Tribe, located in Oregon, became the first, and so far only, Indian
tribe "to codify' the definition of marriage as a fundamental right regardless of
the biological sex of the parties."5 Writing before the Coquille Tribe's
decision, one prominent scholar predicted that "[w]hile the issue of same-sex
marriage[] is far from the forefront of tribal governmental issues . . . there
remains the distinct possibility that one or more of the 560-plus federally
recognized Indian tribes will take action to recognize same-sex marriage in
their jurisdictions."5 9 On the other hand, the nation's two largest tribes, the
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and the Navajo Nation, have both approved
laws against same-sex marriage (although not before two Cherokee women
successfully obtained a marriage license from their tribe) .60 These
developments also have led other tribes to revisit their own marriage policies.6 '
The Coquille Tribe's decision to honor same-sex marriages was expressly
rooted in both cultural values and practical concerns. Its tribal code states that
"the formation, continuity and recognition [of] domestic relationships are
essential to the political integrity, economic security and the health and welfare
of the Tribe.",62 Tribal officials have characterized the decision as consistent
with "the Tribe's historic tradition of accepting people with different
lifestyles-'none of [the Tribe's traditional] mores would have excluded same63
sex relations [or marriage]."'

Sexual and gender diversity in Indian culture, both historical and
contemporary, is a rich and complex subject, full of its own scholarly disputes,
and an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say it
is impossible to generalize about Indian understandings of, and attitudes
toward, homosexuality and same-sex relationships. But controversies over
gay/lesbian rights "ha[ve] not stopped at reservation borders,"64 and so there is
no reason not to assume the issue will inevitably arise in adoption proceedings
under ICWA.
In the following sections I explore what impact ICWA might have on
adoption proceedings in tribal court (Part II) and state court (Part 111) where the
petition is brought by a gay man, lesbian, or same-sex couple. To simplify the

58. Julie Bushyhead, The Coquille Indian Tribe, Same-Sex Marriage, and Spousal
Benefits: A PracticalGuide, 26 ARiz. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 509, 509 (2009).

59. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Same-Sex Marriage, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution,
61 U. Mij'mi L. REv. 53, 55 (2006) (footnote omitted).
60. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and lliberalism, 95 CAL. L. REv. 799, 837
& nn.284-85 (2007).
61. See Jacobi, supra note 55, at 847.
62. COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBE CODE § 740.0 10(2) (2008).
63. Bushyhead, supra note 58, at 510 (quoting radio interview with Coquille tribal
chief Ken Tanner and scholar Brian Gilley) (bracketed alterations in original).
64. Riley, supra note 60, at 836.
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discussion and eliminate some variables, I assume that the birth parents have
voluntarily relinquished their rights. I further assume the prospective adoptive
parent (or at least one parent, if a couple is involved) satisfies ICWA's
placement preference; 65 if the proposed adoptive home is non-Indian, I assume
no member of the child's extended family, the child's tribe, or another tribe
seeks to adopt the child. In short, I assume the child is not being removed from
the birth home involuntarily (meaning ICWA's procedural safeguards for

termination of parental

rights66

do not apply) and ICWA's placement

preference is satisfied.

11.

GAY/LESBIAN ADOPTIONS INTRIBAL COURT

In this section, I explore how ICWA might make a difference to
gay/lesbian adoptive parents who are required to petition in a tribal court. 6 ' The
key principle at work in this section is the tribe's inherent sovereignty, as
recognized by federal law. Where a tribe disfavors homosexuality or same-sex
relationships, this sovereignty could operate to deny an adoption to petitioners
who would have been qualified to adopt in a state court. On the other hand,
where a tribe is willing to grant a gay/lesbian adoption, that same sovereignty
means the adoption is entitled to recognition everywhere--even in states that
forbid such adoptions.
Recall that a tribal court will have exclusive jurisdiction over an adoption
proceeding if the child is domiciled on the reservation; if the child lives off the
reservation, the proceeding may have been transferred to the tribal court if it
also involved a termination of parental rights.6 The form and rules for such a
proceeding vary greatly from tribe to tribe, because the diversity among tribal
courts is "enormous."6 Indeed, it is not entirely clear how many of the 565
federally recognized tribes have a judicial system qualifying as a court. One
scholar, relying on government data, puts the number at something over 200.70
A prominent Indian jurist and scholar estimates the number is closer to 150."'
And a 2005 Department of Justice report said that since 1998, government
grants had been made to 294 tribes "for planning, improving, and enhancing
65. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text; 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2006).
66. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (c) (2006) (providing tribal fight to intervene); id., § 19 12(a)
(providing for notice to the tribe); id., § 1912(f) (specify~ing that the evidentiary standard for
termination of parental rights is "beyond a reasonable doubt").
67. ICWA defines a tribal court broadly as "a court with jurisdiction over child
custody proceedings and which is either a Court of Indian Offenses, a court established and
operated under the code or custom of an Indian tribe, or any other administrative body of a
tribe which is vested with authority over child custody proceedings." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(12)
(2006).
68. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
69. Atwood, supra note 11, at 592.
70. Jd. (citing United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Directory of Tribal Judiciaries (October 1996)).
71. B.J. JONES, ROLE OF INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2000),
http://www.icctc.orgfTribal Courts-final.pdf.
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tribal justice systems. ,,12 Furthermore, adjudication in a tribal court may be
relatively informal, relying on customs and traditions rather than written
statutes or precedents; judges and counsel may or may not be attorneys.7
A.

In Tribal Court, Tribal Law Controls

The power of Indian tribes over affairs on their reservations stems from
the principle that "American Indian tribes are sovereign nations," even though,
as a practical matter, that sovereignty is problematic and constrained by "[tlhe
political realities of relations with the federal government, relations with state
and local governments, competing jurisdictions, complicated local histories,
circumscribed land bases, and overlapping citizenships."7 Accordingly, it is
"settled black-letter law . . . that Indian tribes retain plenary and exclusive
inherent authority over 'domestic relations among tribal members."' 7 1 ICWA
underscores a federal mandate of respect for child welfare determinations by
tribes, and "state laws have never been held to reach further than federal laws
into the hard inner core of tribal authority over domestic relations."7
A gay or lesbian individual or couple who satisfy ICWA's placement
preferences and live in a state where they would be eligible to adopt might
assume they are in the clear. But a petitioner in a tribal court cannot rely on
state law; the relevant law is that of the tribe.7 If the proceeding originates in or
is transferred to a recognized tribal court exercising proper jurisdiction, and the
court refuses to grant the adoption-for whatever reason-that is almost
certainly the end of the matter. Thus, we have the first potential gay/lesbian
anomaly under ICWA: if a tribal court obtains jurisdiction, and the tribe
disfavors the idea of gays or lesbians as parents, an individual or couple could
be denied an adoption they might have obtained in state court.
Such an outcome might leave the prospective parent(s) feeling their rights
have been violated. But it is important to remember that "tribes cannot be
encompassed in the usual constitutional dialogue of individual rights. Tribal
sovereignty necessarily situates Indian nations beyond the federal-state
paradigm that dominates individual civil liberties discourse within the U.S."7"
And although Indian tribes are required, under the federal Indian Civil Rights

72. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
PATHWAYS TO JUSTICE 6 (2005), available at http://www.law.und.edutji/web assets/Pdf/

PathwaysReport.pdf.

73. See JONES, supra note 71, at 6; Hollinger, supra note 27, § 15.02[1][a] (Even
where it has a court, a tribe may waive the right to exercise jurisdiction under ICWA. "This
is not an uncommon occurrence, especially in adoptions, because many tribes do not have
their own adoption codes or tribal agencies which can supervise adoptive placements.").
74. DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TsIANfNA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 5 (2001).

75.
76.
77.
78.

Fletcher, supra note 59, at 54 (quoting COHEN'S, supra note 27, § 4.01[21[c]).
Id. at 80.
See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
Riley, supra note 60, at 808 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Act,7 to respect certain federal constitutional rights of any person over whom
they have jurisdiction-Indian or non-Indian-including equal protection of the
laws and due process, 80 a federal court of appeals has held the categorical
denial of adoption rights to gays and lesbians based on their sexual orientation
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection or due process
guarantees.'
B.

Full Faith and Creditfor Tribal Adoption Decrees

Now let us reverse the previous scenario. What if a petitioner's home state
law would prohibit an adoption, but a tribal court, acting with proper
jurisdiction, was willing to grant it? For the same reasons discussed above,8
such an adoption would be valid. And here is the interesting part: ICWA also
commands that such an adoption must be recognized not only by the state
where it occurs, but by all other states, the federal government, and other Indian
tribes. Specifically, ICWA provides that
[t]he United States, every State, every territory or possession of the
United States, and every Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe
applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the same extent that
such entities give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of any other entity.83
Such protection of tribal court judgments under full faith and credit flows
from the principle that tribes possess inherent sovereignty; their legal regimes
are entitled to respect, and their legal determinations are entitled to finality.
While this requirement might at first seem radical, it is really common
sense-and in effect, if not by design, a significant protection for the rights of
the adoptive parent. Given traditional state authority over family law questions,
79. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006).
80. Id. § 1302(8).
8 1. Lofton v. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11 th Cir. 2004). A

Florida state appellate court, relying on its own form of equal protection analysis, later struck
down the Florida ban at issue in Lofton. See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. Adoption
of X.XG. & N.R.G., No. 3D08-3044, 2010 WL 3655782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 22,
2010).
82. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
83. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2006); see also COHEN'S, supra note 27. at 833 ("Once a
tribal court exercises jurisdiction in an Indian child custody proceeding, all tribal, state, and
federal courts must afford full faith and credit to its orders and judgments. Thus, under
[ICWA], all forms of government within United States territory are required to recognize
and enforce the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of any federally recognized
tribe applicable to a custody proceeding for an Indian child. This broad requirement arguably
exceeds the Constitution's requirement of full faith and credit, because it expressly imposes
obligations on federal and tribal institutions as well as those of the states." (footnotes
omnitted)).
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every state is, of course, entitled to maintain its own policies on who is
qualified to adopt. But once an adoption becomes final, a parent should be able
to move from state to state secure in the knowledge that his or her legal
relationship to the child will not change. Even in the non-LCWA context,
federal law supports this proposition, as two federal courts of appeals have
ruled that states must recognize gay/lesbian adoptions finalized in other
jurisdictions.8 As the subject is not without controversy, it is worth a brief
digression to explain the principle of full faith and credit for adoption decrees.
The starting point is the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause, which
provides: ''Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.""5 In interpreting the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, the Supreme Court has distinguished between the
credit one state owes to another state's laws (legislative measures or common
law), and the credit owed to another state'sjudgments. For laws, the Court has
said the Full Faith and Credit Clause "does not compel 'a state to substitute the
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter
concerning which it is competent to legislate."' 86 In other words, a state may
invoke its own public policy in refusing to give effect to the laws of another
a samestates (as, for example, many states do when they refuse to recognize
87
sex marriage that was performed under the laws of a sister state).
By contrast, judgments get the strongest measure of full faith and credit.
Where an issue has been litigated and decided by a court of competent
jurisdiction, another state may not refuse to recognize the judgment simply
because it disagrees with the outcome or the underlying policy. As the Court
underscored in Baker, "[a] court may be guided by the forum State's 'public
policy' in determining the law applicable to a controversy. But our decisions
support no roving 'public policy exception' to the fuill faith and credit due
judgments.""8

Because it is finalized by means of a court decree, an adoption is a
judgment. Accordingly, relying on Baker, two federal circuits recently have
held that states may not invoke their own anti-gay public policies in order to
refuse to recognize adoptions finalized in other states .89 As the Fifth Circuit
observed in a case involving a Louisiana child who was adopted in a New York
court by a same-sex couple, "[tlhe parental rights and status of the Adoptive
84. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
85. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
86. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Pac. Employers
Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Conim'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939)).

87. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to the Same-Sex MarriageDebate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 353, 358-59 (2005).
88. Baker, 522 U.S. at 233 (citation and footnote omitted).
89. See Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2010); Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d
1139 (10Oth Cir. 2007).
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Parents, as adjudicated by the New York court, are not confined within that
state's borders and do not cease to exist at Louisiana's borders." 90
To summarize, where ICWA gives jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
to a tribal court, it does so with the recognition the court is fully entitled to
adjudicate matters of domestic relations, and that Indian courts are entitled to
have their judgments recognized and respected by all other court systems
within the United States.
H1I.

GAY/LESBIAN ADOPTIONS UNDER

ICWA IN STATE COURT

The previous section hypothesized tribal court settings that were either
negative or positive toward gay/lesbian adoptions. In this section, I explore
how ICWA might affect gay/lesbian adoptions of Indian children in state
courts. After a brief overview in Section A of federal preemption doctrine, in
Section B I hypothesize a state court that is receptive to gay/lesbian adoptions
and consider whether ICWA allows a tribe to veto such an adoption. Then in
Section C, I consider whether ICWA makes any difference where a state law
forbidding gay/lesbian adoptions would frustrate the placement of an Indian
child in an Indian home.
Recall that state court jurisdiction is allowed if the Indian child is not
domiciled on the reservation. However, where a case involves terminating
parental rights the state court must transfer the matter to tribal court upon
petition of either parent, the child's Indian custodian, or the tribe, unless either
parent objects or the court finds "good cause" to deny the transfer. ICWA does
not expressly provide for transfer in voluntary adoptions. 9'
Central to the discussion that follows is the principle that as federal law,
ICWA displaces, or "preempts," state law to some extent. Thus, some brief
background on the doctrine of federal preemption will be helpful.
A.

FederalPreemptionDoctrine

The Constitution's Supremacy Clause provides that federal law "shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding. 92 Because "nearly every federal statute addresses an area in
which the states also have authority to legislate,"9' courts have developed the
doctrine of federal preemption to "define the sphere of control between federal
and state law when they conflict, or appear to conflict.",94 Specifically, "[w]hen
Congress legislates in a field within its enumerated powers, typically under the
Commerce Clause, courts must determine how much state law has been
90. Adar, 597 F.3d at 708.
91. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.

92.

U.S. CONST.

art. VI, ci. 2.

93. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 225 (2000).
94. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L.
Rrv. 967, 968 (2002).
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displaced in the process. Consequently, preemption doctrine is central to the
definition of power and control under our federal system of government." 95
Federal legislation is often unclear about exactly how Congress wishes federal
law to interact with state law, and so "preemption doctrine seeks Congress's
96
intent on the scope of displacement of state law.",
The Supreme Court has articulated special preemption principles in the
context of federal Indian law, noting in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe
that "' [t]he unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty' and the federal
commitment to tribal self-sufficiency and self-determination make it
'treacherous to import ...notions of preemption that are properly applied to ..
.other [contexts]." ' Rejecting a "narrow focus on congressional intent to preempt state law as the sole touchstone," the Court has focused on "the nature of
the competing interests at stake" among the tribe, the state, and the federal
government. 98 As the Court has stated the rule, "State jurisdiction is pre-empted
by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal
and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are
sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority." 99
It is important to note that Mescalero Apache Tribe and the cases it
discusses deal with state efforts to regulate affairs on Indian reservations, where
there is greater potential the state might infringe on federal and tribal interests.
By contrast, Indians living off the reservation generally are "subject to the same
state laws as everyone else unless a federal law or treaty grants an
immunity. "'0 As the Supreme Court has explained, "Absent express federal
law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have
generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable
to all citizens of the State.'"'' If an area of regulation is within the states'
traditional police powers-as is the case with adoption, like all family lawthen off-reservation Indians "may be regulated by the State . .. provided the
regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the
Indians." 0
95. Id. at 969.
96. Id. at 969-70.
97. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) (quoting White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (ellipses and brackets in
original)).
98. Id.
99. Id.

100.

PEVAR,

supra note 34, at 13 5.

101. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
102. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968)
(explaining that while a federal treaty may give Indians the right to fish in a state's waters
that are adjacent to a reservation, the state retains the authority to enforce neutral regulations,
such as the manner of fishing or the size of the take, against Indian fishermen in the same
way as those regulations are enforced against non-Indians); See also Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962) (illustrating that even where reserved by federal
treaties, off-reservation hunting and fishing rights have been held subject to state regulation).
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Most courts have concluded that where ICWA preempts state child
welfare law, it does so narrowly and specifically. 0 13 Although Congress retains
plenary authority over Indian affairs,'04 ICWA is not comprehensive childwelfare legislation, and thus it cannot be said Congress intended to "occupy the
field" (in preemption language) where Indian child welfare is concerned. While
ICWA gives tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over Indian children residing on
a reservation, its provisions aimed at state courts are measured and specific, and
they all relate to one overarching theme: that Indian children should be kept in
Indian homes whenever possible.105 In ICWA's legislative history, Congress
characterized the Act as providing "minimal safeguards" and specifically said it
did not intend to "oust the State from the exercise of its legitimate police
106
powers in regulating domestic relations.
In short, where ICWA applies in state court, it does so against a backdrop
of traditional state authority to regulate domestic relations, including the power
to govern members of Indian tribes living outside a reservation. In assessing
whether state law "interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests
reflected in [ICWA]," 0 the trick is to neither overread ICWA, thus ceding
state authority to a tribe in a way Congress did not intend, nor to underread it,
thus rendering its provisions mere suggestions rather than supreme federal law.
With these principles in mind, I consider how ICWA might operate in two
more hypothetical settings: first, where a tribe seeks to invoke its disapproval
of homosexuality in order to block an adoption state law would permit; second,
where a state's anti-gay adoption policy would prevent an adoption by a family
or tribal member whom ICWA presumes to be the best placement.
B.

What if State Law Supports Adoption Equality But the Tribe Opposes It?

If state law would authorize an adoption by an otherwise qualified gay or
lesbian individual or same-sex couple, and if the tribe is supportive or at least
does not object, then there is no issue. The adoption will be approved. But what
if the tribe opposes the adoption, asserting that the placement would be
inconsistent with its cultural beliefs? The tribe might argue that ICWA' s
purpose is to ensure tribal children are raised according to tribal values. After
all, ICWA incorporates an express congressional finding that "the States..
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and
the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and
families."'10 8 If a tribe presents evidence that homosexuality or same-sex

103. See infra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
104. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-65 (1903).
105. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
106. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 10 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7540.
107. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983).
108. 25 U.S.C. § 190 1(5) (2006).
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relationships are contrary to its cultural and social standards, does ICWA give
leverage to the tribe to veto such a placement?
If a heterosexual adoptive parent is available who ranks higher in ICWA's
placement preference, then the question can be avoided: ICWA should control
and the issue of sexual orientation becomes irrelevant. But what if a morepreferred parent is not available? Should a state court, at the urging of the tribe,
engineer some different placement (or even return an Indian child to foster care
or an orphanage) rather than placing her with an otherwise qualified gay or
lesbian adoptive parent-Indian or non-Indian-solely because the tribe
disfavors adoptions by gay or lesbian individuals or same-sex couples? The
answer is no.
First, it does not appear Congress intended to give tribes such a formal
role in voluntary adoption proceedings where the birth mother is not domiciled
on the reservation. By its plain terms, ICWA allows tribes to intervene as a
matter of right in proceedings for foster care placement or termination of
parental rights; it does not provide for intervention as a matter of right, or even
notice to the tribe, in voluntary proceedings. 0 9 While this interpretation is not
universally accepted by courts, it appears to be the majority view, 10 and it is
the view most faithful to the statutory text. If ICWA does not give the tribe a
right to intervene, and thus a formal role in the proceeding, then the tribe's
opposition to a particular placement should not be given any special weight. In
these circumstances, the tribe has no legally protectable interest.
Of course, ICWA does not prohibit tribal intervention in voluntary
proceedings, and so the tribe could still seek permissive intervention under state
law as an interested party. And the tribe's hand would be stronger in a
proceeding where the court was required to terminate parental rights or
determine foster care placement, as the tribe clearly does have the right to
intervene under those circumstances. 11
Aside from the procedural question of intervention, there is the more
fundamental question of whether Congress intended for Indian law or culture to
have determinative weight in state court proceedings. Even if the tribe is
allowed to intervene and express its views about the merits of a placement,
must a state court defer to those views if it means rejecting a gay or lesbian
parent who meets ICWA's placement preferences and is otherwise qualified
under state law? ICWA's text and legislative history, as well as the federal

109. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d 313, 328 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)
(finding that the tribe was not entitled to intervene as a matter of right, noting that "[m]ost
courts that have considered this issue have agreed with this interpretation," and citing cases
from Alaska, California, and Tennessee); but see In re Desiree F., 83 Cal. App. 4th 460, 47273 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (taking the view that ICWA permits tribal intervention in any "child
custody proceedings"); CoHEN's, supra note 27, at 834 ("[The tribe's] right to intervene
exists in both involuntary proceedings and voluntary proceedings in which parents choose
voluntary termination of parental rights and adoption.").
I111. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911l(c) (2006).
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preemption principles discussed above, compel the conclusion that the answer
is no.
Although "[pirotection of the tribal interest 'is at the core of the ICWA,
which recognizes that the tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from
but on a parity with the interest of the parents,""'" and although ICWA
arguably "privileges Native understandings of family reain,"

it does so

primarily by "acknowledg[ing] broad community connections and obligations
to children."" 4 Where Congress declared its intention to "protect the best
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes and families," it said it was doing so specifically "by the establishment of
minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which
will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.""' Thus, ICWA's concern for
maintaining a child's ties to Indian culture is presumed to be satisfied by
placement, whenever possible, with a family or tribal member.
As federal legislation, ICWA implicates the Supremacy Clause. But it is
the policy of Congress, not the policy of the Indian tribe, that the Constitution
elevates as "supreme." Congress made clear it did not intend to "oust the State
from the exercise of its legitimate police powers in regulating domestic
relations,"'1 and teeicertainly no indication it intended to displace a state's
substantive law of adoption, root and branch, and substitute tribal law. In
voluntary adoptions, the extent of IC WA's preemption of state adoption law is
to specify a sequence of placement preferences."' 7 ICWA does not provide any
other substantive qualifications for adoptive parents, nor does it take a position
on gay/lesbian family households.'
ICWA's adoption section states that "[t]he standards to be applied in
meeting the preference requirements of this section shall be the prevailing
social and cultural standards of the Indian community in which the parent or
extended family resides or with which the parent or extended family members
maintain social and cultural ties."" 9 Although an advocate in court might press
on this language to argue that ICWA requires a state court to defer to the tribe's
cultural values in granting or denying an adoption, such a broad reading is not
supported by the legislative history. In explaining this passage, the House

112. COHEN's, supra note 27, at 825 (quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52 (1989)).
113. Id. at 820.
114. Id. (citing tribal court opinions articulating such an understanding of family and
community).
115. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006).
116. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 10(1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7540.
117. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2006).
118. Though, as I will argue infra, there is a good argument that 1CWA should
override a state's anti-gay adoption law if such a law presents a roadblock to placement of an
Indian child in an Indian home.
119. 25 U.S.C. 19 15(d) (2006).
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ICWA report states only the following: "All too often, State public and private
agencies, in determining whether or not an Indian family is fit for foster care or
adoptive placement of an Indian child, apply a white, middle-class standard
which, in many cases, forecloses placement with the Indian family."120 Thus, in
this provision Congress was reiterating its dismay that state courts and child
welfare workers, applying their own notions of proper families and households,
were going out of their way to avoid placing Indian children in Indian homes.
The "standards to be applied" provision means state judges and other officials
must not impose their own preconceptions to avoid following ICWA's
placement preferences. It does not mean Congress was authorizing state courts
to import substantive tribal law or culture into their own adoption proceedings.
In addition, Congress could not have intended state courts to get in the
middle of disputes among Indians about Indian culture. If an Indian petitioner
who happens to be gay or lesbian steps forward to adopt an Indian child, it is
reasonable to presume he or she is aware of tribal debates about sexuality and
gender but has concluded his or her sexual orientation would not prevent him
or her from being a good parent. Intra- or inter-tribal differences regarding
sexuality and gender may be appropriate for resolution in a tribal court. But a
court sitting in a state that allows adoptions by qualified gays, lesbians, or
same-sex couples should not be expected to weigh anthropological, historical,
or religious evidence about tribal culture." 2 '
Giving the tribe an adoption veto would, in effect, transform its role from
intervenor to ultimate adjudicator, exercising power tantamount to that of a
tribal court. In In re Laura F.,'12 ' a tribe argued a state court could not authorize
any adoption involving the tribe's minor children because such adoptions ran
contrary to its "child-rearing practices and longstanding custom and
tradition."123 Analyzing the question as one of the full faith and credit owed to a
tribe's laws,'124 a California appellate court concluded that "ICWA does not
require a state court to apply a tribe's law in violation of the state's own
legitimate policy nor does it empower a tribe to control the outcome of the state
court proceedings ."'25 'Where a state court is allowed to exercise jurisdiction
under ICWA, the state court is obligated to apply its own state's law; the
sovereignty of the tribe must yield to the sovereignty of the state.
Finally, allowing a third party's views about sexuality and gender to
control an adoption proceeding also would have implications for the rights of

120. H.R. REP.

No. 95-1386, at 24 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546.

121. See Riley, supra note 60, at 847 ("[B3jecause Indian tribes vary dramatically in
their governmental structures, cultures, and contemporary lives, Congress and the Supreme
Court have recognized that the federal courts are ill-equipped to differentiate between
them"). The same is true, of course, about state courts.
122. In re Laura F., 83 Cal. App. 4th 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
123. Id. at 591 n.3.
124. Which must be distinguished from the full faith and credit owed to tribal court
judgments. See supra Part II.B..
125. LauraF., 83 Cal. App. 4th at 586.
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the prospective parents. Whereas tribal court proceedings may be more likely to
subordinate the rights of prospective adoptive parents because children are seen
as the responsibility of the entire community, a state court must be sensitive to
individual liberties.126 In Lofton v. Department of Children and Family
Services, the Eleventh Circuit held that a Florida statute barring adoption by
gays and lesbians did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
or due process clauses.127 The court reasoned that adoption is a statutory
privilege, not a right;12 1 foster parenting did not create an expectation of
permanency that would implicate the fundamental right to family integrity; 2 9
and laws disadvantaging gays were subject only to rational-basis review, which
the Florida statute met.)30 But even assuming the Eleventh Circuit's decision
was sound, it cannot mean a court may give determinative weight to an
intervening party's views about the merits of gay/lesbian parents and thereby
deny an adoption its own state law would allow. As the Supreme Court
observed in Palmore v. Sidoti, a case involving race and child custody, "Private
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect."''
While a state law disadvantaging gays and lesbians may be upheld if it
advances some legitimate state interest, that principle does not license a court
to decide a family law matter based on a third-party's anti-gay prejudice, even
if that prejudice is grounded in legitimate cultural traditions that are entitled to
respect. ICWA does not import tribal law into state court adjudication, and
therefore, a ruling based on negative tribal attitudes toward homosexuality or
same-sex relationships would have no "rational relationship to legitimate state
interests."' 2
C.

Does ICWA Override Anti-gay State Adoption Law?

For our final hypothetical, suppose we are in a state that restricts
gay/lesbian adoptions.133 Further suppose the most-preferred parent for an
ICWA adoption (i.e., a family or tribal member) also happens to be gay or
lesbian or part of a same-sex couple with a marriage or civil union. To comply
with state law, the court may have to refuse the adoption. Can ICWA help? I
believe the answer should be yes. I will first sketch the opposing argument,
then explain what I think is the better view.
126. See Atwood, supra note 11, at 608-18 ("At the very least, one can surmise that
the cultural importance of children among Indian tribes may inform tribal court adjudication
in ways that distinguish it from adjudication in the state court systems").
127. Loton v. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11Ith Cir. 2004); but
see supra note 46 (the statute at issue was later struck down by a state appellate court).
128. Id. at 809.
129. Id. at 811-17.
130. Id. at 817-27.
131. Pahnore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
132. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
133. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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The argument against using ICWA to override a state's anti-gay adoption
law would begin by noting that ICWA works only a partial preemption of state
law; it does not displace a state's entire adoption regime. 134 A court may ignore
ICWA's placement provisions for "good cas"" surely compliance with a
state's law on who is qualified to adopt (as long as the law is neutral as to
Indians) constitutes "good cause." Whether or not adoption restrictions are wise
or well-considered, they reflect the state's view about the relative merits of gay
and lesbian family households. And in any case, Congress did not intend to
make a blunderbuss of its placement preferences. 1 16 No one would argue, for
example, that an Indian child's 10-year-old brother should granted an adoption
if he is the only available extended family member (and thus is most-favored
under ICWA), because adoption laws often include minimum age
requirements"3 ' (and as a matter of common sense, no one would thrust
parenting responsibilities onto a 10-year-old).
Moreover, courts generally have applied ICWA preemption narrowly. As
one state high court recently observed, "Congress . . . contemplated that
procedures in Indian child custody cases would vary among the states.""3 '
Another state high court takes a similar view that "ICWA is not pervasive, allencompassing legislation, but rather sets forth minimum standards that must be
followed," and thus, state "statutes can be read so as to harmonize them with
the ICWA."' And yet another state court has observed Congress has not
"stated an intention for the ICWA to occupy the area of child custody
proceedings completely."040 These readings are supported by ICWA's
legislative history, which states explicitly that the Act "do[es] not oust the state
from the exercise of its legitimate police powers in regulating domestic

relations."'14 1

These are all reasonable arguments. Should a petitioner's sexual
orientation or relationship status become an issue in an ICWA adoption, the
view I have sketched above represents a safe, conventional position: that
Congress could not have intended ICWA to override a state's view about
gay/lesbian adoptions. But I think a better, more persuasive argument can be
made on the other side. The argument in favor of displacing the state's law
would go as follows.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See infra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2006).
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Many states, e.g., Texas, provide that an adoptive parent must be an "adult,"
which presumably means 18 or older. TEX. FAM. ANNm.CODE § 162.402(5) (Vernon 2007).
Other states, e.g., Delaware, set a minimum age of 21. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13 § 903 (2009).
Illinois says an adoptive person must be "[a] reputable person of legal age," but allows
minors to adopt "by leave of court upon good cause shown." 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
50/2-2 (a)-(b) (West 1993).
138. Valerie M. v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Sec., 198 P.3d 1203, 1207 (Ariz. 2009).
139. In re D.S.P., 480 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Wis. 1992).
140. In re J.J.C., 302 S.W.3d 896, 899 (Tex. App. 2009).
14 1. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7540.
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Gays and lesbians are not and cannot be categorically banned from
parenting children. A state cannot criminalize homosexuality,142 prevent gays
and lesbians from producing their own biological children, or, absent evidence
of harm, remove a child from a gay or lesbian parent for no reason other than
the parent's sexual orientation. The issue of gay/lesbian parenting has arisen
frequently in litigation in recent years, but states defending restrictions on
adoptions or marriage by same-sex couples generally have not attempted to
argue that gays and lesbians are categorically unfit as parents. 4 4' An anti-gay
adoption law should not be understood as a finding that gay/lesbian parents
pose harmn to children that the state must prevent (a proposition that, in any
event, is not supported by credible social science research).'"4 Rather, a
prohibition on gay/lesbian adoption is simply a statutory expression of the
state's view that heterosexual homes should be privileged because they are
better.
The Lofton litigation over Florida's former adoption law confirms this
understanding. In defending its adoption ban before the Eleventh Circuit,
Florida did not argue gays and lesbians made unfit parents-indeed, it could
hardly have done so, since Florida allows gays and lesbians to serve as foster
parents.145 Instead, Florida argued it was entitled to determine "what adoptive
home environments will best serve all aspects of the child's growth and
development."146 As the Eleventh Circuit noted,
Florida argues that the statute is rationally related to Florida's interest
in furthering the best interests of adopted children by placing them in
families with married mothers and fathers. Such homes, Florida
asserts, provide the stability that marriage affords and the presence of
both male and female authority figures, which it considers critical to
optimal childhood development and socialization. In particular,
Florida emphasizes a vital role that dual-gender parenting plays in

142. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating state sodomy laws).
143. See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. Adoption of XXG. & N.R.G., No.
31308-3044, 2010 WL 3655782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2010) (noting, in a decision
striking down Florida's ban on adoptions by gays or lesbians, that "no one attempts to justify
the prohibition on homosexual adoption on any theory that homosexual persons are unfit to
be parents").
144. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ANSWERS TO YOUR
QUESTIONS: FOR A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HOMOSEXUALITY
5 (2008), available at http://www.apa.org/topics/sofientation.pdf ("[S]ocial science has
shown that the concerns often raised about children of lesbian and gay parents-concerns
that are generally grounded in prejudice against and stereotypes about gay people-are
unfounded.").
145. See Lofton v. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 823-24 (11 th
Cir. 2004).
146. Id. at 8 10 (emphasis added).
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shaping sexual and gender identity and in providing heterosexual role
modeling. 141
Fine (our argument would continue), a state is entitled to its view that two
opposite-gendered heterosexuals constitute the best home for a child, and the
law as determined by the Eleventh Circuit is that such a policy does not violate
the federal constitutional rights of gays and lesbians. But the issue here is not
individual liberties, it is federal preemption. Therefore, the relevant question is
whether a state's definition of the "best" adoptive home (i.e., the absence of
homosexuals) frustrates the federal policy of placing an Indian child in the best
home as determined by Congress and specified in ICWA's placement
preferences-that is, an Indian home. In this case, it does. State law "interferes
or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in [IC WA]"',4 1 if the
state allows its view of a child's best interests (that is, heterosexual parents) to
negate IC WA's view of a child's best interests (placement in an Indian home).
Indeed, the view that children are best raised in two-parent, dual-gender
households evokes the same kind of family stereotypes that state courts and
child-welfare workers were imposing on Indian communities prior to ICWA"a white, middle-class standard" that "foreclose[d] placement with [an] Indian
family."'14 9 In its official guidelines on ICWA, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
("BIA") echoes this point: "The legislative history of the Act makes it clear that
Congress intended custody decisions to be made based on a consideration of
the present or potential custodian's ability to provide the necessary care,
supervision and support for the child rather than on preconceived notions of
50
properfamily composition."'
Finally, what about the loophole in ICWA allowing states to deviate from
its placement preferences for "good cause"?' 5 ' ICWA does not define "good
cause"; the BIA guidelines "suggest several possible bases for finding good
cause, including request of the biological parents or children of suitable age, the
child's extraordinary physical or emotional needs as established by qualified
experts, and the unavailability of suitable families meeting the preference

criteria despite 'diligent search."' 152

Whatever "good cause" means, it cannot mean the state simply gets to
substitute its view of a child's best interests-here, that a heterosexual
household would be better than a gay or lesbian household-for ICWA's
placement preferences. As one commentator has noted: "Conspicuously absent
from the list of justifications for deviating firom the placement preferences is a
147. Id. at 818-19.
148. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983).
149. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 24 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546.
150. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg.
67,5 84, F. 1. (Nov. 26, 1979) (emphasis added).
15 1. See 25U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2006).
152. COHEN'S, supra note 27, at 844 (quoting and citing Guidelines for State Courts;
Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, F.3.(a) (1979)).
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determination that adherence to the preferences would not be within the child's
best interests-presumably because the BIA did not wish to invite state courts
to engage in a highly discretionary and potentially biased analysis."'5 3 At least
one state supreme court has made the same point, observing that "a finding of
good cause cannot be based simply on a determination that placement outside
the preferences would be in the child's best interests." 5
The tendency of some state courts to use the traditional best-interests
standard as a loophole to avoid complying with ICWA has been a recurring
theme in ICWA litigation and commentary. Commentators have criticized such
manipulation of the best-interest standard where it "only serve[s] to further the
abuses in state court proceedings that Congress sought to eliminate through the
55
enactment of ICWA."'1

Such use of a traditional "best interests" standard is in direct conflict
with the Act. The "best interests of Indian children" must be viewed
within the context of ICWA. The explicit policy statement in the Act
is to "protect the best interests of Indian children . . . by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique
values of Indian culture." This statement mandates consideration of
the Indian cultural value system as central to the determination of
what is in the best interest of an Indian child. 156
And so, our argument would conclude, a state's adoption restriction
cannot override ICWA if that means denying the adoption to an extended
family member, member of the child's tribe, or member of another tribe who
simply happens to be gay or lesbian or partnered with a member of the same
sex. The state's view that a heterosexual household would be better for the
child does not constitute good cause to deviate from Congress' s view that an
Indian home would be best for the child. Such an outcome would frustrate the
federal objective of keeping Indian children with Indian families, impose
inappropriate preconceptions about proper family composition, and turn the
Supremacy Clause on its head by allowing the state's view of an Indian child's
best interests to frustrate the will of Congress.

153. Barbara Ann Atwood, FlashpointsUnder the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a
New Understandingof State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 643-44 (2002).
154. In re S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 1994).
155. Denise L. Stiffarm, Note & Comment, The Indian Child Welfare Act: Guiding the
Determination of Good Cause to Depart from the Statutory Placement Preferences, 70
WASH. L. REv. 1151, 1168 (1995).
156. Id. at 1162-63 (footnotes omitted).
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CONCLUSION

In a speech he gave in 1973 when he was a relatively new judge on the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, John Paul Stevens, who would later become
one of this nation's most distinguished Supreme Court justices, told an
audience of law students he had been "surprised to note how often the
of the
outcome".. of a typical appellate case "depends, not on our appraisal
57
merits, but rather on our identification of the proper decision maker.",1
Every decision maker-whether he be an umpire in the World Series,
a legislator, a corporate manager, a member of a school board, or a
federal judge-is fallible. But if he has earned the right to make
it is safe to predict
decisions through an acceptable selection process,
58
that most of his decisions will be acceptable. 1
The same can be said of adoptions under ICWA; contemporary
controversies over gay/lesbian rights only add an additional dimension to an
already challenging subject. Where tribal courts act within their sphere of
jurisdiction, their family law decisions are entitled to respect as a matter of
inherent sbivereignty. Where state courts have jurisdiction, the legitimacy of
their decisions depends on proper application of state law, subject to supreme
requirements of federal law and tempered by respect for individual liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution. And where Congress has specifically spoken,
the Constitution requires that federal policy-properly interpreted and
applied-must control. These principles are not controversial. The difficult task
is to identify, in any given case, which sovereign holds the right to decide and
whose law must prevail.

157. John Paul Stevens, The Education of a Judge, Address to Northwestern
University School of Law (1973), quoted in BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN
PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE 168 (2010).
158. Id. (citation omitted)
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